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Abstract 
The Paris Climate Agreement of December 2015 marks a decisive break from the unsuccessful Kyoto regime. Instead of 
targets and timetables, it established a Pledge and Review system, under which states will offer Nationally Determined 
Contributions (INDCs) to reducing emissions that cause climate change. But this successful negotiation outcome was 
achieved at the price of vagueness of obligations and substantial discretion for governments. Many governments will be 
tempted to use the vagueness of the Paris Agreement, and the discretion that it permits, to limit the scope or intensity 
of their proposed actions. Whether Pledge and Review under the Paris Agreement will lead to effective action against 
climate change will therefore depend on the inclination both of OECD countries and newly industrializing countries to 
take costly actions, which for the OECD countries will include financial transfers to their poorer partners. Domestic 
politics will be crucial in determining the attitudes of both sets of countries to pay such costs. The actual impact of the 
Paris Agreement will depend on whether it can be used by domestic groups favoring climate action as a point of leverage 
in domestic politics—that is, in a “two-level game” simultaneously involving both international and domestic politics. 
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1. Introduction 
Climate change policy is a frustrating issue both for 
students of international cooperation and for scientists 
who have studied what is happening to the global cli-
mate system. Scientific evidence about the seriousness 
of the problem continues to accumulate but little ef-
fective action has been taken. However, at the 21st 
Conference of Parties of the UN Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (UNFCCC), almost all the 
world’s states agreed to a new Paris Agreement on 
Climate Change (2015). The purpose of this article is to 
provide a preliminary—and therefore tentative—
assessment of the accomplishments achieved at Paris 
and the conditions under which the Paris Agreement 
can generate policies and actions that make a signifi-
cant impact on global climate change.  
Note that we don’t ask whether the mere existence 
of the Paris Agreement will make a significant impact 
on global climate change. It won’t. Such an interna-
tional agreement can only be effective if it generates 
changes in the behavior of actors with resources that 
can be allocated and reallocated: that is, in the long 
term behavior of states, non-state actors such as busi-
ness corporations, and individuals. A few such changes 
may occur because people recognize the severity of 
the climate issue, but most of them will come because 
leaders of states, publics, leaders of non-state actors, 
and billions of people have incentives—economic, po-
litical, or social—to do so. These incentives will be gen-
erated by political interactions in which states will play 
the leading roles, as well as in gradual normative shifts 
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that influence individual behavior. We therefore focus 
in this article on the politics of climate change policy 
after the Paris Agreement, and in particular on the in-
centives faced by states and the strategies that they 
are likely to pursue.  
For context, even given full implementation of the 
emissions reduction plans tabled at Paris (Intended Na-
tionally Determined Contributions, see Section II) and 
continued pursuit of emissions reductions with the same 
level-of-effort throughout this century, avoidance of the 
benchmark two-degree warming would be very unlikely. 
However, the chances of a disastrous four-degree warm-
ing would shrink materially (Fawcett et al., 2015). 
We begin in Section 2 by exploring the reasons for 
inaction so far on climate issues. Why has it been so 
difficult to make progress on this issue despite its se-
verity and the threats it poses to ecological systems 
and human welfare? And how did these problems af-
fect the negotiations surrounding the Kyoto Protocol to 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and its fate after 1997? In Section 3 we will 
discuss the key provisions of the Paris Agreement, with 
some discussion of the political alignments observed 
during this process. Since the key innovation in ap-
proaches to the climate problem is the system of 
“Pledge and Review” instituted at Paris, we will focus 
our attention there. Section 4 of the paper will analyze 
climate politics post-Paris as a strategic game, in which 
outcomes result from an intersection of the strategies 
pursued by the various major players, in particular 
states. The conclusion will emphasize the main point: 
the Paris Agreement merely creates an opening for ef-
fective action on climate change. Political action by or-
ganized groups, domestic and transnational, will be es-
sential to make Paris work; and this action will have to 
be accompanied by the willingness to pay the econom-
ic price. 
2. The Difficulty of Action on Climate Change and the 
Dead-End of Kyoto 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has 
been convening natural scientists, economists, and 
other experts to write a comprehensive assessment 
report every 5–7 years since 1990. Each assessment 
has strengthened the message: anthropogenic climate 
change is significant, growing rapidly, and in many re-
spects accelerating. Climate change poses a growing 
and in some respects an imminent threat not only to 
fragile ecosystems but to the livelihoods and lives of 
billions of human beings. 
2.1. Inherent Difficulties of Climate Change Action 
If the lack of an effective policy response to climate 
change seems strange in view of scientific findings, it is 
all too easy to understand from a political point of 
view. World politics is a decentralized realm, with no 
common government capable of deciding on a course 
of action and of implementing it through an organized 
hierarchy. Furthermore, climate change is a public bad. 
Almost all countries will suffer from climate change—
some much more than others—but with the exception 
of a very few large entities, the future actions of each 
political unit will contribute only a negligible amount to 
its own suffering. So the incentives to ignore the cli-
mate externalities of one’s own decisions—that is, to 
ignore the negative effects on others—are very large. 
Every country has an incentive to shirk, to free-ride on 
the efforts of others. In simplified form, the climate 
problem resembles the classic Prisoners Dilemma (Bar-
rett, 2003), in which the option of not cooperating typ-
ically is more attractive than cooperation. 
Compounding this difficulty is the issue of burden-
sharing. Any international agreement must pass a basic 
test of fairness, a reasonably equitable apportionment 
of the costs and benefits of implementation. The cli-
mate problem is plagued by multiple difficulties in de-
termining what is fair: the disconnection created by the 
decades-long lags between costly emissions abatement 
and measurable reduction of climate impacts, the mul-
tiple frames for perceiving and assessing equity (e.g., 
total emissions, per capita emissions, historical emis-
sions, national wealth), and the persistent scientific un-
certainty in determining benefits to specific states and 
future generations that would accrue from near –term 
global action. Naturally, leaders and publics in each set 
of countries have distinctive conceptions of fairness, 
which often more or less coincide with their own inter-
ests in not accepting what seem to them dispropor-
tionate burdens. And countries and blocs have unequal 
power, deriving both from their different levels of emis-
sions (making their participation more or less critical to 
an agreement) and from their different degrees of 
asymmetrical vulnerability to the actions of other states 
in domains other than climate (Keohane & Nye, 1977).  
International agreements have been feasible, and 
international institutions have had some impact, on a 
wide variety of issues, ranging from trade to human 
rights. These are also difficult issues, implicating en-
trenched economic interests and threatening the politi-
cal control of governments. Some of them involve global 
public goods. Notably, the Montreal Protocol on Sub-
stances that Deplete the Ozone Layer was negotiated in 
1987, went into force at the beginning of 1989, and is al-
ready having a marked impact on the ozone layer. 
“Why,” one could ask, “is climate change any harder?” 
The answer to this question begins by recognizing 
two key variables that affect the efficacy of global insti-
tutions: the benefits and costs of cooperation, on the 
one hand, and whether the agreement can be en-
forced, on the other. The ratio of benefits to costs is 
obviously important: the higher the ratio, the more the 
incentive to find some way to collaborate in order to 
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secure these gains. This will be true of states, subnation-
al governments, firms, and individuals. But the absolute 
level of costs is also important, since cooperation is risky, 
and when costs are high, states undertaking costly ac-
tion risk being seriously disadvantaged if their partners 
do not fulfill their side of the agreement.  
Due to the decentralization of world politics, hier-
archical enforcement of agreements through global 
government is not feasible. To effectively bind states, 
agreements must be self-enforcing. Grundig, Hovi, Un-
derdal and Aakre (2012, p. 527), drawing on work by 
Barrett (1994) and Telser (1980), have defined self-
enforcing agreements in terms of three conditions: “1) 
no member can benefit by withdrawing; 2) no member 
can benefit by being noncompliant; 3) conditions 1 and 
2 hold without external enforcement.” An example of 
external enforcement, rare in world politics, would be 
UN Security Council enforcement of a resolution 
passed under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter 
such as sanctions against Iraq in the 1990s or North Ko-
rea now. 
Some self-enforcing agreements pertain essentially 
to coordination games, like the common understanding 
in the United States that one drives on the right-hand 
side of the road or many industrial standard-setting ar-
rangements. Once an equilibrium is reached, parties 
have no incentive to deviate from it. But with respect 
to many other agreements, including major climate 
change agreements, participants have an incentive to 
do as little as possible, thereby reaping gains from oth-
ers’ contributions (Keohane & Victor, 2016). For such 
agreements to be self-enforcing, reciprocity typically 
needs to be part of the process. Reciprocity involves 
contingent exchanges so that failure to meet one’s ob-
ligation by one party can be expected to lead to ad-
verse actions by its partners. As a result, the benefits 
that each partner receives from the interaction tend to 
depend on its own performance (Keohane, 1986).  
Global negotiations are typically characterized by 
reciprocity: bargaining inherently involves exchanges of 
promises, or commitments, so that each party’s con-
cessions are matched with gains from the concessions 
of others. This form of reciprocity is as important in 
generating climate change agreements as in other in-
ternational negotiations. But reciprocity is even more 
important at the enforcement stage: in this form of 
reciprocity, states that fail to fulfill their commitments 
face withdrawal by others.  
Trade agreements typically rest on such enforce-
ment reciprocity: a state that violates World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) rules can be punished by withdrawal 
of the benefits it receives from the WTO. Indeed, the 
adjudication institutions of the WTO are designed to 
facilitate such enforcement reciprocity. Similar pro-
cesses are observed on other issues. Failure to abide by 
aviation safety and security rules may be punished by 
withdrawal of landing privileges, or refusal by airlines 
to fly into certain destinations. Reneging on debts, or 
expropriating private property without compensation, 
often entails penalties, either in accordance with inter-
national agreements or simply by abstaining from fu-
ture investments. In situations like these, states have 
incentives to withhold benefits from treaty partners 
that renege on their agreements, since their domestic 
interests will have suffered from reneging and are like-
ly to support action. Exporters will support trade retali-
ation insofar as its purpose is to deter protection by 
others that adversely affects them, airlines will avoid 
flying into dangerous airspace, and investors are likely 
to shun jurisdictions with a record of expropriation 
without compensation. As a result, when the goods be-
ing exchanged provide specific and easily identifiable 
benefits for particular countries and interests, en-
forcement reciprocity will be specific and relatively 
easy to implement, and is likely to be effective.  
Other factors may also affect support for global in-
stitutions. For instance, sometimes the symbolism of 
multilateral agreements is so important that it can be 
used by political actors, usually operating at the do-
mestic level, to achieve outcomes in line with the 
agreements’ objectives. Human rights institutions do 
not rest on reciprocity, are not enforceable, and their 
rules are frequently violated. But they are not costly to 
their sponsors, and groups within countries where hu-
man rights are contested can sometimes use these in-
stitutions as “hooks” to grab onto, calling attention to 
international norms and seeking to shame their com-
patriots into conforming more closely to them (Sim-
mons, 2009). These efforts are not always successful, 
but the international norms provide some leverage for 
domestic political actors. Sometimes a norm is so per-
vasive and strong that it turns an activity into a taboo 
(e.g., slavery), making adherence to international 
agreements easier although still not necessarily univer-
sal (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). The practice of international 
election monitoring provides another case in point: the 
result may be “D-elections” rather than failures (Kelley, 
2009), but there is often some impact. Climate change 
has considerable symbolic importance, which could 
enhance the likelihood that domestic political actors 
would use international climate change norms effec-
tively to influence domestic politics.  
When institutions involving global public goods are 
concerned, it is difficult to employ enforcement reci-
procity directly: the good (such as less climate change) 
cannot be withheld from free riders precisely because 
it is public. Sometimes enforcement reciprocity can be 
provided through sanctions, especially trade sanctions, 
but such sanctions will not only damage their targets 
but will also harm importing or exporting interests at 
home in the short term. Although as noted above, ex-
porters may support such sanctions for reasons of de-
terrence, they may be inhibited from doing so by the 
short-term costs. Finally, providing public goods can 
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have symbolic benefits for providers; but these bene-
fits are only likely to make an impact when material 
costs are low. For instance, it turned out that the Mon-
treal Protocol was not costly to states: cheap substi-
tutes for the offending ozone-depleting chemicals were 
rapidly found. Furthermore, the favorable benefit-cost 
ratio of Montreal provided incentives for governments 
to threaten trade sanctions against states that violated 
its provisions—and since potentially noncomplying or 
non-participating states were few and the costs of 
sanctions low, these threats were effective. And the 
costs of monitoring compliance were low as well.  
Unfortunately for efforts to protect the global cli-
mate, actions to reduce climate change are costly, re-
quiring major changes in carbon-based economies. If 
technological progress continues rapidly, these costs 
should not be so great as to require major changes in 
life-styles, but they will be considerable, and will re-
quire a shift of resources toward climate action, lead-
ing to higher energy costs, higher taxes, and probably 
reduced services to citizens. For example, the IPCC cal-
culates that a cumulative reduction in global consump-
tion of 3–11% by 2100 is necessary to achieve an emis-
sions pathway which has a high probability of avoiding 
a two-degree warming, the currently accepted bench-
mark for a dangerous warming (IPCC AR5, 2014, WGIII 
Figure SPM.2). Accepting the costs of actions to limit 
climate change will be difficult for democratic publics 
and unpopular with authoritarian leaders striving to 
gain in wealth and power. States will therefore seek 
when possible to employ bargaining power to shift 
these costs onto others. Reciprocity will be essential to 
making agreements self-enforcing but will be difficult 
to implement.  
2.2. Pathologies of the Kyoto Process 
The inherent difficulty of slowing climate change and 
eventually stabilizing the climate has discouraged 
states from taking costly actions on this issue, since it 
has seemed doubtful that others will follow. In addi-
tion, the structural problems we have mentioned have 
been compounded by differences among countries in 
the costs of action, as a result of diverse energy mixes 
and endowments, and differential views on impacts 
and adaptation possibilities. For instance, pathways 
characterized by stringent emissions reduction would 
result in reductions in investment in fossil fuel extrac-
tion of about $0–90B for OECD countries vs $0–280B 
for non-OECD countries per year for the period 2010–
2029 while requiring increases in annual investments in 
energy efficiency of about $0-300B and $0–330B for 
OECD and non-OECD countries respectively over the 
same period (IPCC AR5 WGIII Figure TS-39). Not only do 
these potentially massive shifts bear significant impli-
cations for the relative status of domestic interests and 
for the relative economic position of each country vs 
others. They also reveal the huge uncertainties that 
decision makers face.  
As a result, only the European Union (EU)—whose 
publics were most committed and whose political sys-
tems included Green parties either in government or 
contending for power—was willing to take the lead. In 
the Kyoto agreement, the EU offered a larger per-
centage reduction from 1990 levels than the United 
States or other OECD countries—although using 1990 
enabled it to incorporate emissions-heavy East Ger-
many in its baseline while the US was faced with a 
projection of more rapid emissions growth above the 
1990 baseline. But in recent negotiations, since the 
EU was already committed to very large reductions in 
emissions, it had little reciprocity-based leverage in 
bargaining with other countries and groups. Due to 
domestic politics, and in contrast to many countries, 
the EU cannot credibly threaten to do less in response 
to non-performance by others. 
International cooperation is typically slow and in-
cremental, reflecting governments’ unwillingness to 
commit substantial resources without an assurance of 
a supportive coalition. But such incremental action can 
have a substantial impact over time insofar as it builds 
on past achievements. The World Trade Organization, 
for instance, built on the General Agreements on Tar-
iffs and Trade, which also pushed toward liberal trade 
policy and was also rooted in reciprocity, but which did 
not have the dispute settlement provisions established 
under the WTO. However, in the climate change arena 
previous agreements did not provide a firm foundation 
for incremental progress. On the contrary, they incor-
porated three fatal flaws that generated a dead-end in-
stead of a foundation for progress.  
The first flaw was that no agreement was ever 
reached in the UNFCCC process on how to utilize voting 
to decide issues, so the default rule of consensus was 
used. Naturally, this rule gave disproportionate power 
in the decision-making process to states that sought to 
block or disrupt the effective action, even if they were 
small and weak. In Copenhagen in 2009, a proposed fi-
nal document was blocked by a small number of op-
posing states, none of which was a major emitter.  
The second flaw was that the Kyoto Protocol relied 
on a “top-down” model of targets and timetables. At 
the 1997 meeting in Kyoto that produced the Protocol, 
states had agreed to specific emissions reductions, us-
ing 1990 as a base year and extending out to the end of 
an initial commitment period in 2012. These reductions 
were meant only as a first step and were not intended 
to be sufficiently steep to halt anthropogenic climate 
change. But they were generated through an interna-
tional negotiating process that had little input from 
domestic politics, and they were quite precise. As a re-
sult, the United States refused to ratify the Protocol; 
Russia held out opportunistically for favorable treat-
ment on other international issues when its adherence 
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became crucial to Kyoto’s entry into force; Australia 
delayed ratification for ten years despite a favorable 
emissions allotment compared to other OECD coun-
tries; and some ratifying countries, notably Canada, 
failed to comply with their commitments or even to 
come close (and Canada eventually withdrew from the 
Kyoto Protocol).  
The third flaw was that the UNFCCC process, as 
specified in the Berlin Mandate of 1995 and institu-
tionalized in the Kyoto Protocol, exempted developing 
countries from any emissions reduction obligations. In 
this respect, Kyoto was a step backward from Montre-
al, which had included developing countries under its 
mandatory provisions reducing production of ozone-
depleting substances but had allowed them much 
more time to meet the obligations and offered them 
financial compensation for doing so. Yet it turned out 
that major developing countries such as China and India 
grew rapidly after 1995 and therefore quickly became 
major sources of annual emissions. The exemption of 
developing countries—with China becoming a major ex-
porter of goods to the United States—became a key 
reason for the reluctance of the United States to ratify 
the Protocol. Kyoto therefore accomplished the per-
verse double trick of imposing politically unsustainable 
burdens on wealthy democracies while avoiding put-
ting any constraints on countries that were becoming 
major sources of emissions and were their trade com-
petitors (Victor, 2011). 
For these reasons, by 2010, after the unsuccessful 
Copenhagen conference of 2009, it had become clear 
that Kyoto, though not necessarily the UNFCCC, was a 
dead-end.  
3. Pledge and Review at Paris and in the Future 
Instead of trying to confront the realities of interna-
tional climate change policy head-on, as Kyoto did, the 
Paris Agreement represents an “end-run” around these 
constraints, using discretion and vagueness rather than 
mandates and simplicity. 
3.1. Discretion and Vagueness 
Discretion was incorporated into the negotiation pro-
cess at COP19 in 2013, by deciding that each state was 
to submit its Intended Nationally Determined Contribu-
tion, specifying what it intended to do. As of December 
15, 2015, 160 submissions, covering 187 countries ac-
counting for 95% of total global greenhouse gas emis-
sions, had been submitted, with the remainder of emis-
sions coming from bunker fuels and from countries not 
part of the UNFCCC (Climate Tracker, March 14, 2016). 
Each state could submit INDCs of whatever format and 
detail they preferred. As a result, INDCs present a wide 
variety of levels of ambition and types of action; so it 
was virtually impossible to refuse to submit them. All 
states had at minimum an interest in an agreement in 
Paris that would validate their INDCs as acceptable 
opening bids. The incentives were therefore the oppo-
site of those facing states whose negotiators had agreed 
to Kyoto targets and timetables, which might possibly be 
difficult to meet and (even without credible enforce-
ment arrangements) embarrassing to miss. At Paris, it 
would have been embarrassing not to submit an INDC. 
Such discretion was clearly advantageous for facili-
tating negotiations, since the most contentious issue of 
all—how to share the international emissions reduc-
tion burden corresponding to avoidance of a danger-
ous climate change— was simply not grappled with, 
nor was any date for this reckoning set. (This burden-
sharing problem can be viewed, equivalently as the 
problem of how to allocate the limited remaining emis-
sions headroom between today’s atmospheric levels of 
greenhouse gases and that corresponding to a two-
degree warming.) Postponing a decision on this crucial 
issue could be viewed as the ultimate act of kicking-
the-can-down-the road, enabling politicians to avoid 
paying the cost of their declared commitment to mov-
ing toward a stable global climate. But in view of the 
political constraints at Paris it was an essential decision 
that needed to be made for some progress to take 
place. We should not, however, pretend that the prob-
lem was by any means solved; we can only hope that 
the next few years will be used well, enabling technol-
ogies, practices, and international relationships to ad-
just to an emissions-constrained world.  
The INDCs range from ambitious in terms of what 
states may be reasonably able to achieve given focused 
national action to resembling business-as-usual, that is, 
requiring little additional effort. They also span a range 
from being highly specific about actions needed to be-
ing disturbingly vague. The US INDC is very specific in 
term of regulatory actions and some observers regard 
it as highly ambitious, especially given the contentious 
US political scene. With China’s carbon dioxide emis-
sions from fossil fuel combustion apparently decreas-
ing between 2014 and 2015 (Jackson et al., 2015) and 
coal use probably having peaked, its plan may not be 
highly ambitious but it is, like the US plan, very specific 
as to anticipated actions. Russia’s plan is neither ambi-
tious nor specific. For states having the capacity to 
forecast emissions and implement policies to influence 
their economic development, these diverse approaches 
to INDCs are strategic choices that bear implications for 
the outcomes discussed in Section 4.  
National discretion also enabled countries to devel-
op their INDCs in a manner that enabled them to re-
spond to the interests and views of domestic constitu-
encies. Their implementation is therefore likely to be 
somewhat easier than otherwise, and seems unlikely to 
face the same level of domestic opposition that result-
ed in the refusal of the United States to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol and Canada’s withdrawal from its Kyoto 
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commitments. When a state submits its instrument of 
ratification, its INDC’s become its “Nationally Deter-
mined Contributions” (NDCs) unless superseded by an 
updated filing. Some NDCs (particularly those of China 
and the US) are already well along in implementation. 
Another feature of the Pledge and Review process 
that was attractive both to governments that were re-
luctant to make commitments, and to governments 
uncertain about their ability to meet targets, was its 
vagueness. For instance, there is no binding obligation 
actually to implement the plans indicated in the NDCs. 
Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement states as 
follows: “Each Party shall prepare, communicate and 
maintain successive nationally determined contribu-
tions that it intends to achieve. Parties shall pursue 
domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achiev-
ing the objectives of such contributions” (emphasis 
ours). The ‘aim of’ phrase is reminiscent of language in 
Article 4 of the original UNFCCC in 1992 that turned out 
to be entirely ineffective. Furthermore, the key Pledge 
and Review provisions in Articles 13 (on transparency) 
and 14 (periodic review) are also vague.  
Article 14 is short and merely provides for a global 
stocktaking of implementation every five years begin-
ning in 2023. The first three paragraphs of Article 13 
emphasize the flexibility of the process as opposed to 
demands placed on states. Most of the remaining ten 
paragraphs provide general justifications for transpar-
ency (Paragraphs 5 and 6), general statements about 
decision-making (Paragraph 4), instructions or requests 
to states to provide information (Paragraphs 7–10), or 
discussions of the technical expert reviews of infor-
mation provided by states (Paragraphs 11–12). Even 
the requests for information in Paragraphs 9 and 10 
differentiate between developed country Parties, 
which “shall” provide information, and developing 
country Parties, which “should” do so. The last two 
paragraphs (14 and 15) emphasize the support to be 
provided for developing countries to implement Article 
13. Finally, the key procedural provision for transpar-
ency procedures (Paragraph 13) does not specify such 
procedures but is only an injunction to the Conference 
of Parties itself to make a decision in the future. In oth-
er words, Article 13 elevates vagueness to an art form.  
Pledge and Review will only work if there is trans-
parency, so that governments have a reputational 
stake in taking costly actions; otherwise we can expect 
a pattern of unobserved reneging, accompanied by 
misleading governmental statements. Yet there is no 
strong textual or legal basis for confidence that trans-
parency will be implemented or that Pledge and Re-
view will therefore be important. The value of the 
Pledge and Review process will therefore depend on 
whether governments make it more transparent and 
demanding; and these actions will depend on the in-
centives that they face. To assess the value of COP 21, 
therefore, we need to analyze these incentives.  
3.2. Incentives for Governments for Transparency or 
Opaqueness 
Governments have many demands on them, and al-
ways have constrained resources. Whether democratic 
or not, they respond to pressure from influential inter-
est groups. So why should they act on climate change? 
Apart from a sense of altruism toward future genera-
tions on the part of societies or their leaders, five spe-
cific purposes can be distinguished: 
1) To achieve domestic purposes, such as to re-
duce air pollution (including soot/black carbon) 
emissions or to achieve energy system changes 
that are not directly related to climate change; 
2) To respond to pressure from domestic constitu-
encies. If such pressure is sufficiently strong, 
domestic motivations are sufficient and interna-
tionally-based incentives to act are redundant; 
3) To gain specific benefits from other states—
especially in this case, specific reciprocity in 
terms of greenhouse gas reductions; 
4) To gain diffuse benefits from other states and 
perhaps from civil society elsewhere. For exam-
ple, if a small state supports a climate change 
treaty that is strongly endorsed by the United 
States and China, it could expect to receive a 
more sympathetic hearing for its own requests 
of these great powers for aid or diplomatic sup-
port than if it opposed such a treaty; 
5) To impress domestic constituencies, or avoid 
blame, by cultivating international reputation, 
or otherwise to leverage international negotia-
tions for domestic political purposes, as in our 
discussion of two-level games below.  
Agreeing to Paris was consistent with these incen-
tives for all 187 states submitting INDCs because the 
agreement places only modest burdens on states and, 
as we have seen, is vague at key points. The symbolic 
reputational gain of adherence, and the advantage of 
having one’s own non-enforceable pledges acknowl-
edged in the agreement, exceeded the costs. On the 
other side of the ledger, the reputational costs of op-
position would have been high for most states.  
The same reputational logic does not apply to 
forthcoming decisions: specifying what Article 13 on 
Pledge and Review means and following up by foster-
ing transparency; meeting the NDC targets and enhanc-
ing targets progressively as called for in the Agree-
ment. Unlike the promises incorporated in the NDCs, 
these decisions will be costly. How will governments 
think about them? 
4. Post-Paris Climate Politics as a Two-Level Game  
What the Paris Agreement will lead to is uncertain, 
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since its provisions are so vague and many decisions on 
making them more specific will be the result of a de-
centralized political process. But what is certain is that 
climate outcomes after Paris will follow from what can 
be characterized as a “two-level game” (Putnam, 
1988), involving a combination of international strate-
gic interaction and domestic politics. One level is that 
of international negotiation; the other level pertains to 
coalition-building in domestic politics.  
One way of thinking about such a situation—which 
admittedly simplifies but may also clarify—is to begin 
by analyzing it as a strategic game with a limited num-
ber of key actors. In deciding on the specific provisions 
for Pledge and Review, states will be crucial; so we can 
begin with an interstate game, with three types of 
players, each type having a distinctive strategy. In reali-
ty, none of these three groups is unified: individual 
countries within each of the three types of players 
have somewhat different interests, and even when 
their interests overlap, they may have difficulty con-
certing policy with one another, partly because they 
compete in policy dimensions other than climate. And 
we do not mean to imply that the negotiations that will 
take place all occur within the framework of the COP 
meetings. Many of them will take place in meetings of 
groups such as the G-20, and even more may be bilat-
eral or “minilateral,” involving a small number of coun-
tries. And some bargaining is implicit.  
Committed governments in OECD countries need to 
act in a way that enhances their ability to persuade oth-
er states to make commitments, principally through ne-
gotiation reciprocity—tit for tat bargaining. But they also 
must maintain or bolster domestic support, and for their 
long-term commitments to be credible they need to lim-
it the freedom of action of future governments of their 
own countries. Yet they are constrained by the public 
goods nature of the problem: as we have seen, climate 
agreements cannot be enforced through simple reci-
procity, involving threats or actions to stop reducing 
one’s own emissions. Instead, enforcement reciprocity 
must be indirect, through sanctions on trade or financial 
flows, which may widen the sphere of conflict as well as 
generating domestic opposition from affected interests. 
So maintaining domestic support for costly climate 
change actions that go beyond what the state would do 
in the absence of an agreement is not easy.  
Governments of major emerging market countries 
(BRICs) are affected by climate change and therefore 
have some reason to act on these issues, and they may 
have domestic groups that favor action, either because 
they are concerned about climate change or because 
they see industrial opportunities—for example, the 
construction of solar panels in China—arising from 
global action. Their interest in climate change action 
varies; India and Russia are notably more reluctant to 
act than Brazil and China. Yet all of them want other 
states, in particular the major OECD countries, to act, 
and they know that OECD actions will depend on their 
own commitments. But the principal focus of BRIC gov-
ernments is economic growth. And they want to mini-
mize costs for themselves and to maximize flexibility in 
fulfilling their own commitments. They therefore find 
themselves in a negotiation reciprocity game, seeking 
to do enough to induce action by others and avoid 
sanctions against themselves, but not so much that 
they bear heavy burdens that seriously affect economic 
growth or reduce domestic public support for the rul-
ing group. Some BRIC countries also seek financial and 
technological assistance, which will help to relax their 
own domestic constraints.  
Finally, governments in small, poor states have an 
interest in free riding without detection or at least pun-
ishment. Their major liability is that they lack the ca-
pacity to influence the policies of powerful states; but 
their corresponding advantage is that no one can ex-
pect them to contribute much, except symbolically, to 
solving the climate problem. They are therefore unlike-
ly to be the principal targets of committed states and 
non-state actors seeking to ensure that climate agree-
ments are effective. These small, poor states will seek a 
Pledge and Review scheme that is focused on the ma-
jor polluters and that provides flexibility in the de-
mands imposed on them and monetary compensation 
in one form or another—once again, to maintain do-
mestic support as well as to achieve a variety of other 
objectives.  
In this perspective, the critical question is whether 
there is a zone of agreement that would be beneficial, 
compared to the status quo of no agreement and in-
dependent national action, in these three sets of in-
teractions.  
The two most important negotiating assets of rich 
OECD countries are their ability to limit, or fail to limit, 
their emissions and their willingness to provide finan-
cial and technical assistance. The BRICs’ most im-
portant negotiating asset is generated by their huge 
current and prospective emissions and their ability to 
decide to what extent to reduce them. The poor coun-
tries’ chief asset is their ability to appeal to the princi-
ple of fairness and, if they are unsatisfied, to deny legit-
imacy to any deals that are made.  
All sources of leverage are constrained by domestic 
politics. A critical factor, therefore, in whether a zone 
of agreement for specific Pledge and Review provisions 
will be reached, is how strongly domestic publics and 
elites—whose relative importance varies with the polit-
ical system of the country—will support expensive 
measures designed to reduce climate change. As usual, 
domestic politics is crucial in determining whether mul-
tilateral institutions can be effective.  
The OECD countries need the BRICs to accept rela-
tively tight limits on their emissions, such that their 
growth in emissions stops within ten or fifteen years 
and their absolute emissions curves turn downward 
 Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 3, Pages 142-151 149 
shortly thereafter. Policies of the BRICs vary considera-
bly so it is a deliberate oversimplification to treat them 
as a bloc for the sake of analysis. For example, China’s 
Paris commitment, largely embodied in its 2014 bilat-
eral agreement with the United States, foresees an 
emissions peak by 2030. This is not a difficult target for 
China, given that many observers believe that China ac-
tually reached it in 2014 after a period of extraordinari-
ly rapid emissions growth. India, which has been slower 
than China to adopt serious emissions reductions, now 
looms as the most important new source of rapid 
emissions growth. OECD countries hope to see a rapid 
turnaround not only by BRICs but also by other coun-
tries whose economies similarly emerge over time 
(Richels, Rose, Blanford, & Rutherford, 2015). The BRIC 
countries’ willingness to accept clear procedures for 
Pledge and Review, with expectations of enhanced 
pledges on their own parts along with provisions for 
transparency, will depend on their willingness to accept 
such objectives. Their basic decisions on this issue will 
depend in the first instance on their own calculations 
about their own interests. Apart from concessions they 
receive from the OECD countries, what will be the costs 
(especially to economic growth) of action, on the one 
hand, compared to climate-related costs of inaction, on 
the other?  
Since climate change is a public goods problem, we 
know that these calculations alone will not yield vigor-
ous action on emissions limitations by the BRICs. They 
will need concessions of three types by the OECD coun-
tries: on emissions, on technical assistances, and on fi-
nancial aid. That is, the BRICs will calculate what their 
prospective willingness to accede to strict Pledge and 
Review procedures will gain them in negotiations with 
the OECD countries. They will seek to assure that their 
current competitive economic advantages over the 
OECD countries are not sacrificed in a climate agree-
ment and that they are offered access to markets for 
new climate change-related products that they would 
have a comparative advantage in making. It follows 
that an OECD-BRIC climate agreement will turn on how 
forthcoming the OECD countries will be about emis-
sions limits, technical assistance, flexibility on trade 
(such as the emerging agreement of trade in green 
goods and services), and financial aid.  
For the OECD-poor country negotiations, the game 
is simpler. The OECD countries needed the consent of 
poor countries to the Paris Agreement, due to UNFCCC 
rules, but it is not very important to them what the 
small, poor countries actually do, since their emissions 
are so small. They need these countries not flagrantly 
to increase emissions, in a way that leads BRICs to do 
the same. For their part, the poor countries seek to 
avoid being targets of sanctions by OECD countries, 
and to obtain more funding for adaptation and tech-
nical aid. They would also like to have an amplified 
“loss and damage” provision, but since the large-
emitter countries adamantly resisted such a commit-
ment at Paris and in fact imposed a ban on liability or 
compensation from damages in this context, any such 
deal will instead emphasize adaptation funding. A deal 
between the OECD countries and the small, poor coun-
tries that provides for lax reporting requirements (al-
ready foreshadowed in language agreed at Paris) and 
substantial adaptation aid seems feasible. These con-
cessions would be justified by the low incomes, and 
state capacity, of these poor countries.  
At the moment, the BRICs-poor country bargaining 
game is the least important, since the poor countries—
reluctant to make costly commitments themselves—are 
therefore disinclined to press the BRICs to reduce emis-
sions; and the BRICs (with the exception of China) are 
only reaching the point of being able to give sufficient fi-
nancial aid to induce greater effort from the poor coun-
tries. As the BRICs become richer, this bargaining game 
is likely to become more important, insofar as the BRICs 
take mitigating climate change seriously.  
If the OECD countries are sufficiently committed to 
slowing and stopping climate change, there seems to 
be room for OECD-BRIC and OECD-poor country deals 
that, in both strategic games, make both parties better 
off than in the status quo. The OECD countries would 
secure some otherwise unavailable contributions to 
reducing emissions—some of which can be reduced 
relatively cheaply in the BRICs and poor countries. The 
BRICs and poor countries would gain technical and/or 
financial benefits that are easier for the OECD states to 
provide than for the BRICs and poor countries to gen-
erate for themselves.  
What is less clear is whether the resulting deals will 
enhance the effectiveness of the COP-21 Pledge and 
Review process in helping the world limit climate 
change. We can imagine high-level equilibria of these 
games that would do so. These equilibria would induce 
substantial cuts in emissions by the BRICs and would 
avoid explicit and coordinated opposition to the 
agreement by poor countries. They will be costly for 
OECD countries and their domestic publics but their 
costs may be spread over a diverse set of objectives, 
both climate and non-climate. At the same time, coop-
erative mechanisms for achieving these multiple objec-
tives may operate in a range of venues, for example 
current negotiations under the Chicago Convention to 
reduce emissions from aviation and under the Montre-
al Protocol, to control production of hydrofluorocar-
bons (Stewart, Oppenheimer, & Rudyk, 2015). Finally, 
finding a satisfactory equilibrium will depend heavily 
on technological progress aimed at moderating the 
cost of alternative energy. 
We can also imagine low-level equilibria: an OECD-
BRIC deal that enables both sides to pursue essentially 
business as usual under the cover of an agreement 
(thereby protecting their reputations) and an OECD-
poor country deal that essentially exempts poor coun-
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tries from effective emissions reductions. In such a 
low-level equilibrium, poor countries and some of the 
BRICs will pretend to combat climate change and the 
rich countries will pretend to pay them for doing so.  
What is clear is that whether negotiations lead to 
substantial emissions cuts will not depend chiefly on the 
text of the Paris Agreement. It will depend much more 
on domestic and transnational politics within and be-
tween the OECD countries and the BRICs. This is to say 
that by itself the Paris Agreement accomplishes little—
but it opens what was a locked door. That door is now a 
little bit ajar –pushing hard could carry us through it to a 
better outcome, but nothing will be accomplished at the 
international negotiation level alone. There will have to 
be pressure within the OECD countries for vigorous 
emissions action by wealthy states and for financial sup-
port for effective action in poorer countries. And that 
pressure will have to entail willingness to pay.  
5. Conclusion: Climate Change Politics and 
Transnational Civil Society 
The Paris Agreement is less an accomplishment than 
part of an ongoing process. It opens the door to pro-
gress on climate but does not assure it. For Pledge and 
Review to work there will have to be clear expectations 
that pledges will be regularly upgraded, and substantial 
transparency so that compliance with pledges can be 
monitored. There may also have to be willingness on 
the part of those countries most committed to climate 
change to punish those states that fail to make serious 
commitments or renege—although as we have seen, 
such enforcement reciprocity is difficult on issues in-
volving public goods.  
We have emphasized the importance of domestic 
politics in affecting the outcomes of the interstate stra-
tegic games on climate change policy. But in the era of 
the internet and social media, domestic politics is 
closely linked to transnational interactions. Transna-
tional movements and organizations can play an im-
portant role in mobilizing support within countries for 
costly climate change action. Such movements will be 
most important not when they simply point to the fail-
ure of others—their targets—to support climate 
change action, but when they mobilize support for 
costly action by their own supporters, and the coun-
tries in which they are based.  
For the Paris Agreement to put the world on a path 
toward limiting climate change to acceptable levels, 
publics, organized and mobilized in many countries and 
transnationally, will need to act politically, and will 
need to make their political actions credible by being 
willing to pay the necessary economic price.  
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